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LECTURE (1-hour)

COORDINATION OF FEDERAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Prepared by

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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(As Revised)

Enclosures: 2 Charts

I. GENERAL

The purpose of this talk on the subject of coordination of Federal foreign intelligence activities is to acquaint you with the latest developments in this field.

Naturally, discussion of this subject will deal generally with the agencies responsible for this coordination, namely, the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group, both established in Washington, D. C. In particular, it will deal with the provisions of the Presidential directive authorizing these agencies and the manner in which this directive is being implemented.

In presenting this subject the following topics will be discussed in order that you may appreciate the background as it affects the problem at hand:

1. Need for coordination of Federal foreign intelligence activities.
2. Designation of a National Intelligence Authority.
3. Creation of a Director of Central Intelligence.
4. Designation of an Intelligence Advisory Board.
5. Establishment of a Central Intelligence Group.
6. Relationship of departmental intelligence agencies to the Central Intelligence Group.

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7. Organization of the Central Intelligence Group (tentative).
8. Development of the Central Intelligence Group.

III. NEED FOR COORDINATION OF FEDERAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

In the years preceding Pearl Harbor, coordination of Federal foreign intelligence activities was practically non-existent except for infrequent formal but haphazard exchange of information and intelligence between departments. The Army was interested from a strategic standpoint primarily in gathering all possible information of our potential and probable enemies as it affected ground- and land-based air operations. The Navy primarily wanted information on the Japanese and German Navies; in other words, their bases, their capabilities and intentions as possible threats to the United States. The State Department was carrying the greatest load in trying to foresee world events as they were developing, particularly in the political and economic fields, and to determine the intentions of the European Axis and the Japanese as these intentions might affect the foreign policy of the United States.

In other words, each of these departments was conducting unilateral intelligence activities, using primarily its own sources and based upon its own departmental viewpoint and interests. Yet each of these departments required intelligence information of primary interest to another. For example, the War Department, in estimating military capabilities, required political and economic intelligence of primary interest to State and Naval intelligence of primary interest to the Navy. Without proper coordination for interchange between these departments, it is obvious that none was receiving adequate intelligence information required to discharge its responsibilities. Moreover, while it is true in the intelligence field that a certain amount of overlap is necessary and healthy, uncoordinated intelligence

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activities involve much unnecessary duplication, with a resultant waste of manpower and money.

Worst of all, the lack of an agency responsible for coordinating intelligence activities meant that no one was taking an over-all national viewpoint or producing strategic and national policy intelligence required by the President and other top-level Government officials for the formulation of national policies and the making of decisions necessary to safeguard our national security.

The serious and tragic results of this lack of coordination was clearly and unforgettably demonstrated by Pearl Harbor. This disastrous event which thrust us into the war led immediately to the development of all possible expediences to correct the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff came into being, and with them the Joint Intelligence Committee, both modelled upon the British committee system. The Joint Intelligence Committee during the war consisted of the intelligence chiefs of the State, War and Navy Departments, F.E.A., and O.S.S. For the purpose of planning the conduct of the war, therefore, political and economic intelligence was integrated with that of the military.

Since the Joint Intelligence Committee was a committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, it was restricted to producing intelligence from the military rather than a truly national point of view. Also, since J.I.C. estimates required approval by six officials from different departments, this was frequently a slow process and necessitated so much compromise in some cases that the end product was not very clear or definite to the planners who had to use it. Moreover, while the J.I.C. produced integrated intelligence estimates, it did not have the power or ability to do an adequate job of coordinating the various departmental intelligence activities. Also, for all practical purposes it did not do any future planning for intelligence activities.

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It may be seen, therefore, that while the J.I.C. and many other war-born expedients resulted in substantial improvement in our intelligence activities, truly adequate provision was still lacking for the coordination of Federal foreign intelligence activities on a long-term basis from a national point of view.

III. DESIGNATION OF A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. (Display Chart No. 1)

The need for coordination of intelligence, as previously discussed, was recognized by President Roosevelt. He directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the problem and recommend a solution. A proposal devised by the Joint Intelligence Committee was finally approved in a modified form by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and transmitted through the Secretaries of War and the Navy to the President. President Truman directed the Secretary of State to confer with the Secretaries of War and the Navy in order to plan a national intelligence program.

Based upon the resultant recommendation of these three Secretaries, the President, on the 22nd of January, 1946, issued a directive establishing a National Intelligence Authority to plan, develop and coordinate all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. This, then, is the agency charged by the President with overseeing the development of a sorely needed national intelligence program.

In order to tie the development of the intelligence program closely into the conduct of our foreign, political, economic, and military affairs, the President constituted as members of the National Intelligence Authority the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, together with a personal representative of the President. This personal representative of the President is Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief and also a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. N.I.A. policies governing foreign intelligence activities are therefore

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certain to be formulated with full consideration of their benefits to the conduct of our foreign affairs.

IV. CREATION OF A DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

Since the N.I.A. is a part-time committee composed of officials having many other responsibilities, it is obvious that a full-time "executive vice president" is needed to ensure that the policies of the N.I.A. are properly implemented. The President's directive provided for such an official, with the title of Director of Central Intelligence. The present Director of Central Intelligence is Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, formerly Commanding General of the U. S. 9th Air Force in Europe and later the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the War Department General Staff. General Vandenberg succeeded Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, the first Director of Central Intelligence, who was Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence during a great part of the war.

The Director of Central Intelligence is a non-voting member of the National Intelligence Authority. He is appointed by the President but is responsible to the N.I.A. The President's directive prescribes for him the following functions and responsibilities, subject to the direction and control of the N.I.A.:

1. He directs all the activities of the Central Intelligence Group.
2. He supervises the correlation, evaluation and dissemination of strategic and national policy intelligence within the Government.
3. He plans for the coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security.
4. He recommends to N.I.A. such over-all policies and objectives as may be necessary to accomplish the national intelligence mission.

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5. He performs intelligence services of common concern to departments of the Government as directed by N.I.A.
6. He performs such other intelligence functions and duties relating to the national security as directed by the President and the N.I.A.

These express functions and responsibilities cover a broad field of endeavor, and obviously require considerable clarification and redefinition by the N.I.A. This process of redefinition and clarification is continuing all the time, and many basic decisions in that respect have already been made. One of the most significant is a directive by the N.I.A., which authorizes and directs the Director of Central Intelligence to act for the Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established by the N.I.A. are properly implemented and executed. From this it may be seen that the Director is now clearly established as the "executive vice president" for the N.I.A.

V. DESIGNATION OF AN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD.

In order to perform his prescribed functions, the Director of Central Intelligence must keep in close and intimate contact with the departmental intelligence agencies of the Government. To provide a formal machinery for this purpose, the President's directive established an Intelligence Advisory Board to advise the Director of Central Intelligence. The permanent members of this Board are the intelligence chiefs of the State, War and Navy Departments. Provision is made, however, to invite the heads of other intelligence agencies to sit as members on all matters within the province of their agencies. One official frequently invited to sit as a member is the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Intelligence Advisory Board has already proved to be mutually beneficial to both the Director of Central Intelligence and the Board members. On the one hand, the I.A.B. serves to furnish the Director

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with the benefits of the knowledge, advice, experience, and viewpoints of the departmental intelligence agencies. On the other hand, each I.A.B. member receives the benefits of the advice and assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, based upon his broad national viewpoint.

Actually, pursuant to authority granted by the N.I.A., many decisions and actions regarding the coordination of intelligence are taken by the Director of Central Intelligence with the unanimous concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board and without reference in each case to the N.I.A. This is possible, of course, only in those cases where the Director and the I.A.B. already have the authority to execute such agreements. Most of these agreements are reached at I.A.B. meetings, at which the Director of Central Intelligence presides, although some matters are handled by circulation of papers for written approval.

VI. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.

Of course, the Director of Central Intelligence requires an organization of his own to enable him to accomplish his assigned functions and responsibilities. The organization, called the Central Intelligence Group, was provided for in the President's directive.

The funds required by this organization are furnished by the State, War and Navy Departments in amounts approved by the N.I.A. Originally, all personnel and facilities for the Central Intelligence Group were also furnished by these departments. It is and will always be true that certain key positions in C.I.G. are held by specially selected and qualified personnel from the State, War and Navy Departments. However, with the approval of the N.I.A., it is now possible for the C.I.G. to recruit directly from sources other than the three departments the specialized type of personnel required for its activities. This was clearly necessary, to eliminate any possibility of competition for personnel between C.I.G. and the departments, and to enable C.I.G. to tap the rich non-

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Governmental sources of personnel represented by American business, educational institutions, etc.

It might be thought that the mixed group of individuals assigned to C.I.G. would make it hard to conduct an efficient and effective operation. This, however, has not been the case, since all individuals assigned to C.I.G. have fully appreciated the magnitude and importance of the job to be done. As a result, the C.I.G. is already a smoothly functioning organization with more than a nucleus of specially qualified personnel.

VII. RELATIONSHIP OF DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.

As mentioned previously, one of the keys to the success of the Central Intelligence Group is a very close and active relationship with the other intelligence agencies of the participating governmental departments. That, of course, is why the N.I.A. and I.A.B. were established in their present form.

One of the most immediate problems following the establishment of the N.I.A., however, was to fit the activities of the C.I.G. into the existing activities of the departmental intelligence agencies. The role of these departmental agencies was defined in general terms by the President's directive, which stated that these agencies would continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence.

Effective coordination, however, requires that not only must the fields of departmental endeavor be defined and allocated, but that there must be continuous supervision of the departmental intelligence effort to ensure that the policies and objectives of the N.I.A. are implemented and accomplished. To enable the C.I.G. to perform this function, the President's directive stated that C.I.G. should receive such intelligence from the departmental agencies as the N.I.A. may designate, and that the operations of departmental agencies shall be open to inspection by the

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Director of Central Intelligence to the extent approved by the N.I.A. These two provisions really fit together. The best method of ensuring coordination of departmental intelligence efforts is for C.I.G. to receive both the raw information and the finished intelligence from the departments.

First of all, this enables C.I.G. to ensure that each item of raw information has been distributed to all agencies which require it. Secondly, it enables C.I.G. to utilize this information in covering the fields for which it is primarily responsible. Finally, it enables C.I.G. to produce strategic and national policy intelligence based upon all sources of information and the evaluated intelligence from all departments.

C.I.G. will produce its intelligence estimates based upon national needs and viewpoint. While looking to each department to furnish intelligence in its field of primary interest, C.I.G. must nevertheless re-evaluate this information from a national viewpoint as opposed to the departmental viewpoint taken by each departmental agency. C.I.G. must also combine departmental information and intelligence with information received from its own sources. Finally, C.I.G. must correlate the political, economic, military, naval, and all other implications in order to produce a truly national estimate.

It may be seen, therefore, that while this coordinated effort, under N.I.A. control and C.I.G. auspices, properly and unavoidably involves a certain amount of overlap, it nevertheless ensures concentration by each agency on its field of primary interest and filling the gaps from a national viewpoint by C.I.G.

VIII. ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP (TENTATIVE). (Display Chart No.2)

This is the tentative organization that is being built to effect the coordination of intelligence activities as previously described. It is being progressively built on a skeleton basis with the personnel at hand, many of whom have participated in the six-month planning phase

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under Admiral Souers. As new personnel become available and are indoctrinated, they will be fed into the organization in the positions where their special skills may best be utilized, in accordance with this organizational breakdown.

First, there is an Executive Staff, which is designed to relieve the Director of all unnecessary administrative details. In military terms, the Executive Director might be compared to the chief of staff of a Division, Corps, Army or Army Group. The Executive Staff is comparable to the G-1 and G-4. Specifically, the functions of the Executive Staff are as follows:

1. Functions as a staff for the Director of Central Intelligence under the supervision of the Executive Director, Central Intelligence Group, in performing the normal duties of an executive office.
2. Controls, coordinates and supervises activities of operating offices, C.I.G., pertaining to operations, liaison, administration, and general functioning.
3. Coordinates plans and policies affecting operations with the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff.
4. Provides logistical and administrative support for the worldwide activities of C.I.G.
5. Regulates internal security of C.I.G.

Next, there is an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, better known as ICAPS. This might be compared to an Army G-3 in that its function is to assist the Director in coordinating all intelligence activities related to the national security, both C.I.G. and departmental, and to recommend the establishment of over-all policies, plans, and procedures to assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission. This Staff is composed of specially selected and experienced personnel from the State, War and Navy Departments who are able, therefore, to perform their coordinating and planning functions with due consideration of the problems faced by the various participating departments. In addition, ICAPS sponsors frequent discussions of intelligence activities with the officials in the departments responsible for the conduct of those activities. In this way, the views of all agencies are made known and considered so that mutually satisfactory arrangements may be evolved.

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The Secretariat, N.I.A., as its name implies, furnishes secretarial services for the N.I.A. and also for the I.A.B. and the C.I.G.

All of the above have been staff functions for the Director of Central Intelligence. The actual conduct of C.I.G. activities is entrusted to four Assistant Directors, each of whom heads an office. These Assistant Directors are chosen from the departments having primary responsibilities or capabilities in each field of endeavor.

The Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination is responsible for collection and dissemination requirements for strategic and national policy intelligence information and intelligence. In this position he ensures adequate collection and dissemination not only for C.I.G. itself, but for the various departments.

The Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates is responsible, in coordination with ICAPS, for establishing requirements for and producing strategic and national policy intelligence affecting the national security for use as required by the various departments of the Government. He therefore has a dual function. First, in consultation with ICAPS and through ICAPS with the departments, he anticipates the needs of the Government for foreign intelligence. These needs or requirements then form the basis for coordinated collection programs. Second, his office actually performs the evaluation, correlation and interpretation necessary to produce strategic and national policy intelligence for the use of Government officials.

The Assistant Director for Security, and this office has not yet been activated although a nucleus of personnel is already present, is responsible for the following functions:

1. In coordination with the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, formulates and promulgates integrated security policies and procedures pertaining to the safeguarding of classified information and matter of the Federal Government in the interest of national security, to include planning for future censorship operations.
2. Prescribes over-all security policies and procedures for the entire Central Intelligence Group.

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The Assistant Director for Operations is responsible for coordinating designated agencies of C.I.G. engaged in operations approved by the N.I.A. to collect information required for the production of intelligence affecting the national security. He therefore heads up the conduct of those centralized collection operations assigned to C.I.G. by the N.I.A. This office encompasses C.I.G.'s own sources of information to which reference has previously been made.

It may be seen that C.I.G. is organized not too differently from any other intelligence agency, except in one main particular. This is that, in addition to such actual operations as the N.I.A. may direct, C.I.G. must also be organized for the extremely important job of coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security.

IX. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP.

This C.I.G. organization has been carefully developed over the period since its activation on the 8th of February, 1946.

At that time the C.I.G. consisted of a Central Planning Staff, a Central Reports Staff, and a small Administrative Division. Aside from the production, on a very small scale, of national intelligence, the primary activity of C.I.G. during this initial period was a study of the problems facing our intelligence effort, and planning an organization and methods for solving these problems and for coordinating this effort.

At the completion of this phase early in June, Admiral Souers, in his final report to the N.I.A. as Director of Central Intelligence, stated that the initial organizational and planning phase of C.I.G. activities had been completed and the actual operations of centralized intelligence services should be undertaken by C.I.G. at the earliest practicable date.

General Vandenberg, then, has been engaged in organizing and conducting such of these operations and activities as the N.I.A. has directed. Both coordination and operations are now well under way.

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Planning, however, is continuous, and both organization and thinking are being kept flexible to take care of all eventualities in the field of foreign intelligence.

As the work of the N.I.A., C.I.G., and the participating departments progresses, there will be accelerated improvement in our national intelligence program. No possibility for this improvement is being overlooked. In this present stage of development, however, the wholehearted cooperation and assistance of every agency and individual is urgently needed to expedite the attainment of the goal of a United States intelligence operation equal to the position and responsibilities of the United States in world affairs.

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